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21. ABSTRACT
I test the hypothesis that Russian regions with relatively higher reported levels of taxes 
collected would be experiencing more vibrant SME activity. Higher levels of reported
taxes collected suggest lower levels of ‘under the table’ pressure and stronger rule of law. 
The hypothesis is motivated by field work completed in Russia, and is tested with data 
from several state and private organizations. The paper’s conclusions are that, despite 
some progress in this direction, the Russian federal government has failed to reign in the 
predatory (illegal) activities of tax authorities and therefore has not established a healthy 
environment for SME development during Russia’s rocky transition to a market economy.
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43. INTRODUCTION
Much of the criticism of Russia’s managed transition to a market economy focuses on the 
“lost opportunity” of creating a large property-owning class of Russians to be the 
bulwark of future economic and political reforms, as this was done in many of Russia’s 
East European neighbors and China.
Rather than distributing national wealth in an efficient manner, Russia’s early reformers 
focused on rapid liberalization of prices and “mass privatization” that one Russian daily 
called “the largest redistribution of property relations in world history” (Argumenti i 
Fakti). As a result, many Russians saw their life savings wiped out overnight by four 
digit inflation, and their country’s wealth pillaged by a few well-connected individuals.
The reformers placed hardly any emphasis on establishing basic market mechanisms.
Nearly 10 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, parts of Russia’s legal code dated 
back to the 1960s, while a new tax code was not introduced until 2001. A law on 
organized crime was not passed until 1997, and a legal body to combat money laundering 
was not established until after 2000. This legal vacuum provided the wrong incentives for 
businesses during Russia’s early experiments with free market economics, and 
subsequently provided a poor foundation for the country’s future class of entrepreneurs. 
The subsequent privatization schemes of the 1990s also failed to establish a healthy
property-owning class of Russians. The privatization of state property began in October 
1992 and consisted of two phases: “voucher” or “mass” privatization (which occurred 
Oct. 1992 – Jun. 1994), and auction privatization (which began in July 1994 and 
continues to this day). During the first phase, small- and medium-sized businesses were 
auctioned off through a voucher system. During the second phase, large enterprises were 
auctioned through direct cash sales (usually to a single wealthy buyer).
The government’s concurrent decisions to denominate vouchers nominally and to 
liberalize prices caused the value of the vouchers to plummet almost overnight. Another 
major problem was the government’s decision to allow managers to buy out the 
controlling shares of stock in their companies. It ordained factory bosses with a lot of 
control over how the ‘voucher auctions’ took place and whether they accepted vouchers 
at all. As a result, plant bosses became involved with the criminal underworld in hopes of 
obtaining capital to buy the controlling shares of their companies. Often they simply 
resold all of the company’s assets on the secondary market to a competitor or other 
interested party and bankrupted the firm, leaving investors (i.e. those with a minority 
share, often the firm’s employees) without any returns from their vouchers and without 
work (Supyan). In the words of one economist,
“The principal economic shortcoming of…the ‘voucher approach’ was that it did not 
create any economic incentives for the accumulation of capital and new 
investments…Th[e] situation led to numerous abuses and mass disappointment among 
citizens who expected to receive real ownership, dividends, and a visible improvement in 
living standards from their vouchers” (Supyan).
5The consequences of Russia’s botched transition were severe: according to the United 
Nations, average male life expectancy plummeted from 67 to 59 years over the course of 
a decade. Stephen Cohen, an analyst at Columbia University, has argued that Russia 
experienced the greatest drop in population during peacetime in history (Cohen). The 
number of people living below the poverty line skyrocketed to somewhere between 40 
and 80 percent. At the same time there was an exodus of skilled labor from Russia (brain 
drain) coupled with a lack of foreign investment into the country. Finally, the 
productivity of average Russian worker fell from 30% of that of an average American 
worker in 1992 to 19% in 1999. The last point is particularly disturbing because it shows 
that the economy had actually become less efficient after the transition, seemingly 
eliminating the point of privatization (Black, Kraakman, Tarassova 1780). 
Particularly painful for Russian policymakers is that fact that it took GDP (by various 
estimates) somewhere between 15 and 17 years to recover to its 1990 level. Some of the 
other macroeconomic effects are demonstrated in the charts below. Inflation figures for 
the years 1990-94 have been excluded as estimates vary widely (likely percentages were 
in the thousands):
              
Figure 1 Russian Inflation; source: IMF
Figure 2 Russian GDP per capita (PPP);
source: IMF
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64. THE PROBLEM OF SME GROWTH IN RUSSIA
Background
The botched reforms described in the last section created a hostile environment for SME 
growth in Russia. Yegor Gaidar, the chief architect of Russia’s economic transition, has 
always maintained that there was no alternative to his “shock therapy”  (Gaidar). Gaidar’s 
justification for his position is that inflation had become a serious problem for Russia’s 
centralized economy of 1991, and he believed “reforming” all sectors at once would 
cause a quick, one-time jump in the price level (caused in part by the massive monetary 
overhang present in 1991), followed by a return to  macroeconomic stability. Central to 
this idea was the restoration of the ruble’s value, followed by steep budget cuts (Goldman 
97).
In regards to creating a property-owning middle class (which could have been the 
foundation for future SME growth), the biggest question remains: why didn’t the 
government carry out privatization first, which could in principal have allowed Russians 
to spend their savings on acquiring capital for future businesses, instead of seeing them 
wiped out?
During my meetings at the Institute for the Economy in Transition in Moscow (which 
Gaidar now heads), I met several of Gaidar’s experts who emphasized that at the time 
Gaidar came into power, the country was on the verge of hunger due to massive market 
failures (or failure to develop private markets for food). They saw no alternative to the 
immediate freeing of prices (Tagor), which allowed for a free market for basic goods to 
develop overnight.
Others whom I interviewed – from entrepreneur to government official – expressed great 
skepticism that the country was on the verge of hunger in the early 1990s, emphasizing 
that almost every family had a patch of land somewhere in the countryside where they 
raised basic crops (Lubimov). Moreover, other East European countries – such as Poland 
and Hungary – faced exactly the same urgency as Russia during their period of reforms, 
but managed to establish sufficient institutions to facilitate a surge in the number of 
SMEs (Goldman 183-92).
Gaidar’s reforms provided a very poor beginning to SME growth in Russia. Today, 
SMEs are not nearly as vibrant in Russia’s economy as they are in many neighboring 
states. According to a recent report by Alfa Bank, Russia’s largest private bank:
The country’s last official evaluation of SME business was in 2004, and at the time, 
SMEs contributed 12 percent of GDP as opposed to 60 to 70 percent in EU countries. 
They absorbed just 12 percent of the labor force versus 50 to 60 percent in the EU. The 
latest estimates put the SMEs sector at 25 percent of the labor force, while keeping its 
modest 12 to 15 percent contribution to GDP (Alfa Bank).
Perhaps even more alarming is the overall hostile attitude in Russia toward free market 
economics. Many Russians, quite understandably, see the reforms as nothing more than a 
humiliating submission to Western demands. In his latest book, Collapse of an Empire, 
7Gaidar expressed worry about the increasingly popular belief among Russians that a 
healthy, economically vibrant Soviet Union had been subverted into free market 
economics by Western intelligence services and their agents within Russia. The fact that 
such opinions remain popular proves that Gaidar failed in his attempt to popularize free 
market economics through his “shock therapy,” as he had originally intended.
Difficulties facing SME startups
The results of a detailed cross-regional study on SME barriers to entry in the 1990s can 
be found in the book Property to the People: The Struggle for Radical Economic Reform 
in Russia by Nelson and Kuzes. For an account of the criminal situation at the time, 
consult Paul Klebnikov’s book Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the 
Age of Gangster Capitalism.
Speaking to individuals who had founded business during the 1990s, I learned of the “3 
C’s” that were the primary barriers to entry: credit, crime and corruption. Small business 
loans were virtually nonexistent, which significantly reduced the pool of people able to 
open a firm. A man who left the Foreign Trade Department of the USSR Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 1991 to found a window installation company told me that it was only 
thanks to his contacts at various banks that he was able to acquire starting capital. He told 
me that out of his business acquaintances, he was the only one who fully repaid his debt, 
and even that was thanks to the default and currency devaluation of 1998.
The same businessman also described the difficulties faced by any individual attempting 
to register a firm. Despite heavy lobbying on the part of small businesses within the
national parliament, registration remained a costly and time consuming process. This 
particular individual cited bribes in the thousands of dollars (while the average monthly 
wage in Russia was well under $100) and lines that could last for days. Both of these 
factors placed opening a business well beyond the means of most ordinary Russians.
A restaurateur who began his business in the 1990s described the racketeering of the 
times: any business that flourished and began hiring employees in the double digits 
immediately attracted the attention of local mafia bosses. One could either pay 
“protection fees” to one of these mafias, or face vandalism and possible physical abuse.
Developments since 2000
New impetus to developing SMEs was provided in 2000 with the election of Vladimir 
Putin as president. Important steps were taken throughout his tenure, such as the passage 
of new tax, labor and legal codes, the establishment of a “simplified tax” regime for 
SMEs (see Section 5) and the development of the credit and mortgage markets.
Some analysts are bullish about the potential for an explosion in the number of SMEs 
thanks to the vibrant credit market (Mindich). For the first time in Russia’s history, 
ordinary individuals have access to credit for buying household appliances, electronics 
and automobiles. Almost every major electronics store has a ‘credit department’ where 
any consumer can borrow money for purchases (albeit, usually at high interest rates).
8Similarly, credit for housing (i.e. mortgage) has also become available thanks to a 
package of laws pushed through parliament by President Putin in 2005. 
Russian banks have also started lending to SMEs. 2006 saw 90% growth of the SME 
credit market, with its total value passing $10 billion (Expert). A wide body of research 
and literature is now dedicated to exploring the effects of Russia’s credit market on SME 
development (see Expert magazine).
Despite these advances, the entrepreneurs I interviewed during the summer of 2007 
singled out red tape and corruption as the key barriers to their firm’s growth prospects. 
This information was consistent with a nationwide poll conducted by the small business 
lobby organization OPORA Rossii in conjunction with the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade and the VTsIOM polling agency, which found that only 11% of 
SME proprietors reported almost no under-the-table payments to government officials in 
2006 (this figure decreased from 14% the previous year) (OPORA Rossii 57).
The Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) of the New Economics School 
in Moscow has conducted a regular report on “Monitoring administrative barriers to the 
development of small businesses in Russia” since 2002. Results from 2005 and 2006 
indicate “competition” gradually pushing aside the “tax burden” as the primary concern 
of small businesses; the latter had been a clear leader among all possible categories since 
2002. However, despite this optimism, the study confirmed that most businesses still face 
regular “additional payments” as “many principles enshrined in Russian law do not 
function as they are supposed to.” Businesses spend much more than the allotted five 
days on registration, have to pay hefty bribes and are checked by various enforcement 
bodies much more frequently than is legally allowed (CEFIR).
The results are corroborated by the World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), conducted in 2005 and summarized in table 1.. 
Particularly large differences between Russia and its more SME-friendly European 
neighbors were observed in the field of tax collection and bribery.
Question: How frequently do firms in your line of business have to pay some irregular "additional 
payments" for any of the following? To deal with taxes and tax collection
Country (# of observations) Mostly Frequently Sometimes Seldom Never Always 
Czech Republic  (126) 1.6% 2.4% 4% 8.7% 83.3% 0% 
Estonia  (125) 0.8% 0.8% 5.6% 8% 84.8% 0% 
Poland  (209) 2.9% 5.7% 7.7% 12% 71.3% 0.5% 
Russia (532) 3.9% 5.8% 12.8% 14.7% 61.7% 1.1% 
Results for:
Selected countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Russia
Table 1: Frequency of illegal payments to tax authorities
9A number of sources – including the leading Russian newspaper Vedomosti and OPORA 
Rossii – have reported that small businesses currently spend, on average, 10% of their 
profits on bribing state officials (Ivanova).
Anecdotal Evidence
The bribe hierarchy
A long-time grocery store employee in St. Petersburg described how she was pressured 
into paying bribes to the Health Inspector. According to her, the store was as close to a 
customer-friendly business as one could imagine as employees were under no pressure to 
sell old or expired products (a common practice in Russia). However, no matter the 
circumstances, an inspector would always find violations if not bribed. The employee 
brought up a case when the store’s manager was told he was in violation of sanitary laws 
for keeping his freezers at -20 degrees Celsius instead of -19. Soon a pattern would form: 
each month the inspector would arrive, type the amount of the bribe into his/her cell 
phone’s keypad and show it to an employee or manager. They would then proceed to a 
back room, where the money would be placed on a table. The inspector would sweep it 
with a sheet of paper (to avoid any fingerprints) into his/her jacket. According to this 
employee, the amount to be paid to such officials has been increasing exponentially over 
the last few years. Once, when she complained that the store wouldn’t be able to stay 
afloat, the inspector was sympathetic, but said he/she couldn’t do anything about it. Only 
a small amount of that bribe would remain in his/her possession: most is paid to superiors 
in the upper echelons of the Health Inspector’s department.
The store employee believed that SMEs were actually being squeezed out of the national 
economy, to be replaced with large chains (i.e. supermarkets, electronics stores…) under 
the protection of major government officials.
Bribe evasion
The owner of a small grocery store in Northern Moscow described how, at the end of 
each day, she would have a specialist come to clear most of the transactions from her 
register. She insisted that paying the taxes she really owed would have put her out of 
business a long time ago, and balked at the relentlessness of the local tax collectors.
Nearby was a restaurant owned by Azerbaijani businessmen that I regularly frequented. 
Usually open from noon until after midnight, one day the restaurant remained closed until 
after five. This occurred the following day, and soon became a regularity. I later learned 
that the business had continuously been harassed by the health inspector. After learning 
the sum of the bribe he/she had demanded, the Azerbaijanis chose to try to comply with 
the demands. They renovated the building three times, and this was still not enough. 
Finally, after being shut down, they chose to open after the health inspector’s office 
closed each day and therefore remain in operation. After several weeks, a proper sum for 
the bribe was negotiated and the restaurant was allowed to reopen.
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I learned that a similar incident had occurred at this restaurant the previous summer, 
when the proprietors temporarily lost their liquor license. They then proceeded to sell 
hard liquor exclusively to longtime customers by pouring it into unmarked containers and 
bringing it from the back of the kitchen.
The shadow tourist economy
While on a walking tour of Nizhny Novgorod (a major city on the Volga River) in a 
group of about 12 people, I was often straddling behind to take photographs. Over the 
course of one hour, three people approached me with the same question: how did we find 
this tour operator? They were all local residents who were interested in taking a tour of 
their own city, but could not find a single company offering such a service.
When I asked our guide why they didn’t advertise (since it seemed there was a huge 
demand for their services), she tried to shrug off the question by saying that advertising 
space was too expensive. In private, she later confided to me that they operated in the 
shadow economy, not because they wanted to, but because declaring their income would 
inhibit crippling taxes and “operational fees.” The company survived by making deals 
exclusively with other “familiar” firms. In my case, the company I hired in Moscow for 
my tour package (our group visited almost a dozen cities over the course of five days, 
traveling by bus) subcontracted local tours to companies such as this one.
This experience was repeated almost exactly when I took several visiting friends to St. 
Petersburg for a few days. I booked our hostel reservations through an obscure company 
recommended to me by a friend. The price (1000 rubles per room per night) was very 
good, especially considering the central location of the hostel. Paying most of the sum 
upfront in cash, I was given an address in St. Petersburg.
We arrived in St. Petersburg at around 6am and had great difficulty finding the address, 
despite the fact that it was in the center of the city. The hostel turned out to be a 
converted communal apartment. In Soviet times, such apartments housed several families: 
each family had its own room, and everyone shared a common kitchen and bathroom. I 
later learned that the proprietor had bought the apartment at a cheap price, renovated it, 
added an extra bathroom and converted it into a guesthouse. As expected, there was no 
label on the door indicating that it was a hostel (it was on the fifth floor of an ordinary 
apartment building).
When I inquired as to why it was almost impossible to find, the owner – as expected –
told me that they operated “in the shadows” for exactly the same reasons as the company 
in Nizhny Novgorod. They had their own network of “friendly” tourist agencies who 
supplied them with clients, but otherwise tried to remain as obscure as possible. In fact, 
the owner herself also ran a tourist agency and had used the profits to renovate this 
apartment (i.e. this was a downstream business).
The obscurity, however, was not enough to protect the business from the local police 
inspector. However, he had agreed to turn a blind eye to their operation in exchange for 
11
being allowed to book his buddies for free at the hostel at any time. Simply out of luck, 
this particular inspector turned out not to need such services very frequently.
Mafia in the Kremlin
The anecdotal evidence presented above suggests the presence of a large, unchecked and 
extremely detrimental bureaucracy in Russia. Of the “three C’s” barriers to entry, crime 
and capital may have improved since the 1990s, but corruption remains a major obstacle 
to SME growth. In response to an inquiry about the Russian mafia, one businessman told 
me: “The mafia? The mafia is in the Kremlin!” He then proceeded to describe how the 
shadow racketeering that was a major problem in the 1990s has now simply been 
legalized through the methods employed by Russia’s bureaucrats. The major mafia
organizations of the 1990s legitimized their businesses and began to pay taxes, while 
official bodies (e.g. tax and health inspectors) took over the business of obtaining bribes 
from small businesses.  While such assertions are difficult – maybe impossible – to prove 
the ‘fear of the taxman’ that seemed to be prevalent among every businessman I 
interviewed suggests that taxes and tax enforcement policy is a fruitful area for research 
based on hard data.
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5. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION: TAX LAWS, TAX 
POLICY AND SME GROWTH
In 2003, the Russian government adopted a “simplified single tax on the revenues of 
small businesses.” Starting that year, SMEs (firms with under 100 employees) in all of 
Russia’s regions had the option of paying the “simplified single tax” instead of going 
through a standard procedure. The results of CEFIR’s latest report (June 2007) on 
“Monitoring administrative barriers to the development of small businesses in Russia” 
suggest that the reform did make taxes easier and cheaper for SMEs. OPORA Rossii 
reported that by 2006, 61% of SMEs had opted for the “simplified single tax” (OPORA 
Rossii 65).
Under the “simplified single tax,” SMEs have the option of either paying a 6% tax on 
revenues or a 15% tax on revenues minus (rather rigidly defined in Chapter 26.2 of the 
Russian Tax Code) expenditures. The possible effects of opting for either option are not 
examined in this study, and this should have no outcome on the results.
An interesting feature of the “simplified single tax” is that local municipalities were 
given a say in how large of a tax would be levied (within certain federally-dictated
parameters). This is known as the “K2 coefficient,” which allows municipalities to 
influence how high a tax is levied on local businesses (OPORA Rossii 17).
Therefore,
.06* 2*taxescollected K revenues
Or
.15* 2*( exp )taxescollected K revenues enditures 
However, some studies have indicated that the municipalities themselves have little 
influence over the “K2 coefficient,” and that regional governments are largely 
responsible for determining the level of taxation (Chernyavsky and Vartapetov). 
Following the introduction of this “K2 coefficient” across Russia’s regions, only 8% of 
SMEs have reported a lower tax burden (OPORA Rossii 65). In other words, Russia’s 
regions are, to various degrees, using their influence to further tax SMEs.
The (illegal) predatory nature of tax officials described in Section 4 establishes my 
hypothesis for SME growth: regions with relatively higher reported taxes collected 
would be experiencing more SME activity because this would indicate that a larger share 
of collected payments are legal (suggesting stronger rule of law in the region, and less 
‘under the table’ pressure). 
Structure and sources of data
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The data examined concerns the total budgetary revenues of each of Russia’s 83 regions 
(with some minor overlapping due to the amalgamation of some regions by others over 
the last five years). It is available on the website of the Russian Ministry of Finance’s 
Treasury Department and comes in the form of a chart submitted by each region (their 
official account balance) at the end of each month on their total revenues and 
expenditures to date for that year.
This data is compared with information from a report titled “Russian Regions,” recently 
made public by the Russian State Statistics Service. This dataset contains the number of 
registered SMEs in each region, which, if divided by the population of that region, can 
demonstrate the number of “SMEs per capita.” Also available is the annual volume of 
transactions of SMEs by region, which served as a proxy for the tax base; unfortunately, 
this was available only for the years 2005-06.
Sample Weaknesses
Weaknesses include occasionally “bad” numbers for remote regions with too many 
zeroes. Three regions – the Chechen Republic, the Evenkiya Autonomous Okrug and the 
Koryak Autonomus Okrug  - were excluded from the set due to poor or absent 
estimations (indeed, the Chechen Republic was in a state of war until very recently, the 
Evenkiya Autonomous Okrug is one of Russia’s least populated and most isolated 
regions and the Koryak Autonomous Okrug has been amalgamated into the newly formed 
Kamchatka Kray). It is not believed that these exclusions influenced the results in any 
significant way.
Regression 1
It is assumed that the taxes collected are directly affected by the tax base:
taxescollected taxbase  
I assume the following relationship:
0 1*taxescollected taxbase    
The assumption of this model lies in the fact that the error term   can be used as an 
indicator for how stringent a region is with its enforcement of tax collection and its “K2 
coefficient.”
This error term can be represented as:
1* 0taxescollected taxbase    
Assuming that a region’s enforcement of tax laws (represented in this model by  
1* 0taxescollected taxbase      ) affects its total number of SMEs, we come up 
with the following model:
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# 0 2[ 1* ]Total SMEs taxescollected taxbase      
Which is equivalent to:
# 0 2* 1* 1*Total SMEs taxescollected taxbase       
Under the following assumptions:
 Total#SMEs = total number of registered SMEs in a particular region in a given 
year
 taxescollected = total amount (in rubles) of the “simplified single tax on the 
revenues of small businesses” collected in a particular region in a given year, 
reported on its account sheet to the Finance Ministry
 taxbase = estimate for the total volume of transactions of all SMEs in a particular 
region in a given year by the Russian State Statistics Service
This equation was run under a fixed effects model for 84 regions over two years, 2005 
and 2006 (the tax base was available for only these two). Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate the 
results:
Number of Cross 
Sections 84
Time Series 
Length 2
R-Square 0.9995
Pr > F <.0001
Table 2
Variable DF Estimate Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 8.949942 <.0001
tax base 1 -.477 0.442
taxes collected 1 .0189 0.008
Table 3
Regression 2
The second model comes in two steps and uses the same initial assumption as the first; 
namely, that the taxes collected are directly affected by the tax base, and that the error 
term   can be used to represent “enforcement” of taxes:
0 1*taxescollected taxbase    
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An Ordinary Least Squares estimation was run on the above equation for each of the two 
years, 2005 and 2006, to obtain coefficients for the second part of the model (described 
below). The results of these first two OLS estimation are described in Tables 4-7:
Number of Cross 
Sections 84
Time Series 
Length 1
R-Square 0.8079
Adjusted R-
Square 0.8055
Pr > F <.0001
Table 4: 2005
Variable DF Estimate Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 265870587 <.0001
taxe base 1 1483.05040 <.0001
Table 5: 2005
Number of Cross 
Sections 84
Time Series 
Length 1
R-Square .3260
Adjusted R-
Square .3178
Pr > F <.0001
Table 6: 2006
Variable DF Estimate Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 287372914 .0033
tax base 1 4301.77446 <.0001
Table 7: 2006
In step two, the error coefficients obtained from the previous model were used as values 
for “enforcement” for each of the two years.
  0 1*SMEdensity enforcement       
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 SMEdensity = total number of registered SMEs in a particular region in a given 
year, divided by the population of that region for that year
This OLS regression yielded the following results:
Number of Cross 
Sections 84
Time Series 
Length 1
R-Square .2366
Adjusted R-
Square .2273
Pr > F <.0001
Table 8: 2005
Variable DF Estimate Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 3510000 <.0001
enforcement 1 .0059248 <.0001
Table 9: 2005
Number of Cross 
Sections 84
Time Series 
Length 1
R-Square .3925
Adjusted R-
Square .3851
Pr > F <.0001
Table 10: 2006
Variable DF Estimate Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 4730000 <.0001
enforcement 1 .0027438 <.0001
Table 11: 2006
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Both models support the hypothesis: regions with higher rates of reported tax collection –
and, presumably, lower rates of unreported, or illegal, collection – experience higher rates 
of SME activity. Thus, there is a strong negative correlation between the illegal predatory 
nature of local tax officials and the wellbeing of SMEs in that region. These findings are 
consistent with the information presented in Section 4.
While Russia’s early reformers made important progress in the direction of a free market 
economy following the collapse of communism, they largely failed to establish the 
necessary institutions for a healthy SME sector. To this day – despite numerous attempts 
to do so – federal officials have failed to reign in the corruption persistent among Russian 
tax collectors.
This study served as an important start to research I hope to continue over the upcoming 
summer. In establishing a strong negative relationship between corruption and SME 
growth, the study has set up an important – yet much more complex – goal of finding a 
way to quantify the regional level of corruption from available data to further support the 
hypothesis.
18
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